The moral reasoning abilities of men and women with intellectual disabilities who have a history of criminal offending behaviour by McDermott, Emily & Langdon, Peter E.
Running head: MORAL REASONING                                                                      1 
 
 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: McDermott, E. & 
Langdon, P.E. (In Press). The moral reasoning abilities of men and women with 
intellectual disabilities who have a history of criminal offending behaviour. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, which has been published in final form at 
10.1111/lcrp.12051. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
 
The moral reasoning abilities of men and women with intellectual disabilities 
who have a history of criminal offending behaviour 
Emily McDermott 
University of East Anglia 
& 
Norfolk Community Health and Care NHS Trust 
 
Peter E Langdon 
University of Kent 
& 
Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust – Norfolk 
 
Author Note 
Emily McDermott, Department of Psychological Sciences, Norwich Medical School, 
University of East Anglia, UK and Norfolk Community Health and Care NHS Trust, 
UK; Peter E. Langdon, Tizard Centre, University of Kent, UK and Broadland Clinic, 
Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust - Norfolk, UK 
Peter E Langdon is funded by a National Institute for Health Research 
Postdoctoral Fellowship 
This article presents independent research funded by the National Institute for 
Health Research (NIHR). The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not 
necessarily those of the National Health Service, the National Institute for Health 
Research or the Department of Health.  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr Peter E Langdon, 











Purpose.  The current study had the following two aims (a) to examine the moral 
reasoning abilities of four groups of people:  (i) men and women with IDs who had a 
documented history of criminal offending, and (ii) men and women with IDs and no 
such history, and (b) to examine the relationship between emotional and behavioural 
problems and moral reasoning.  It was predicted that (a) there would be no significant 
difference between the moral reasoning of men and women with IDs, (b) men and 
women with IDs who are not offenders will have “developmentally immature” moral 
reasoning in comparison to offenders, and (c) moral reasoning will significantly 
predict emotional and behavioural problems.   
Methods. Sixty-eight men and women with mild intellectual disabilities (IDs) with 
and without a history of criminal offending were recruited and asked to complete 
measures of intelligence, moral reasoning, and emotional/behavioural problems.   
Results. As predicted, men and women did not have different moral reasoning, but 
offenders did have “developmentally more mature” moral reasoning than non-
offenders.  Women had higher levels of physical and verbal aggression, while 
offenders, generally, had higher levels of psychopathology. Women with a history of 
criminal offending had higher levels of sexually inappropriate behaviour compared to 
men and women in the community.  Moral reasoning significantly predicted 
emotional and behavioural problems.  
Conclusions.  Further work in this area is needed, and interventions that aim to 
address a moral developmental “delay” may be beneficial in reducing recidivism 
amongst this population. 
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The moral reasoning abilities of men and women with intellectual disabilities 
who have a history of criminal offending behaviour 
There is evidence of a relationship between moral reasoning and criminal 
offending amongst young offenders (Blasi, 1980; Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; 
Stams et al., 2006), and some evidence to support the existence of such a relationship 
amongst men with intellectual disabilities (IDs) (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson, 
& Palmer, 2011b).  Both Gibbs (2003, 2010) and Palmer (2003a, b) have provided a 
theoretical rationale for the relationship between moral reasoning and criminal 
offending by arguing that young offenders present with immature moral schema, 
which lead to the creation of distorted cognitions and lower levels of empathy, thus 
increasing the risk of criminal offending.   Gibbs (2003, 2010) also argues that social 
skills deficits are common amongst young offenders, while Palmer (2003a, b) 
highlights the important role that peer and parental influence play with regard to 
shaping moral development, which is inherent within moral developmental theories, 
and together they contribute to the propensity to engage in criminal offending.   
Although Langdon, Clare and Murphy (2010a) have criticised the previous 
literature regarding the moral development of people with IDs, they went on to argue 
(Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, 2011a) that the relationship between moral reasoning 
and illegal behaviour should be moderated by intelligence, and this relationship 
should take the shape of an inverted U-curve.  However, it is also possible that the 
relationship may be mediated by intelligence, or intelligence may act as both a 
moderator and a mediator, which was not previously discussed by Langdon et al. 
(2010a).  Recently, Mears and Cochran (2013) evidenced that the relationship 
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between offending and intelligence does indeed appear to be curvilinear amongst a 
sample of people without IDs.  
These theoretical assumptions suggest that those with IDs who have no history 
of engaging in illegal behaviour, should evidence moral reasoning that is 
“developmentally immature”, in comparison to those with IDs and a history of such 
behaviour.  The reason for this is that “developmentally immature” moral reasoning at 
the lower stages of moral development is associated with egocentricity, but also with 
the avoidance of punishment and rule adherence (Stage 1; Gibbs, 2003, 2010), and 
therefore should be associated with a reduced propensity to engage in illegal 
behaviour.  Reasoning at higher, but still “developmentally immature” stages, is 
associated with exchanges, deals and meeting needs, along with some decentration, 
but the continuation of an egocentric bias where one’s own needs and interests may 
take priority continues (Stage 2; Gibbs, 2003, 2010), and as a consequence, the 
propensity to engage in illegal behaviour is increased.  Reasoning at the “mature” 
stages is associated with further decentration, and the development of an 
understanding of pro-sociality, care and good conduct, as well as an understanding of 
society, rights and character  (Stages 3 and 4; Gibbs, 2003, 2010); the potential 
propensity to commit illegal acts is therefore reduced.  
Langdon et al. (2011b) reported that the moral reasoning of men with IDs who 
have a history of criminal offending was indeed more mature than that of men with 
IDs and no such history, which offers limited support to Langdon et al.’s (2011a) 
proposed relationship between moral reasoning, illegal behaviour and intelligence.  In 
an earlier study, Langdon, Murphy, Clare and Palmer (2010b) also reported that men 
with IDs and no known history of criminal offending engaged in moral reasoning at 
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the “developmentally immature” stages associated with avoidance of punishment and 
rule adherence, but specifically in relation to the Law construct on the Sociomoral 
Reflection Measure – Short Form (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), which is a moral 
reasoning assessment questionnaire that is reliable when used with men who have IDs 
(Langdon, et al., 2010b).  
Nevertheless, one of the problems with this research is that it has 
predominately focused on men.  Moral developmental theory has been criticised as 
being inherently sexist as it is based upon masculine conceptualisations of morality 
(Gilligan, 1982).  Lyons (1983) demonstrated that women are more likely to make 
moral judgements based upon a “care” orientation, while men are more likely to 
appeal to “rights”.   However, Lyons (1983) included only 32 participants in her 
study, and it appears that the sample were very well educated, suggesting the presence 
of some sampling bias.  Others have also reported or argued that the moral reasoning 
of men and women is indeed different, (Baumrind, 1986; Crandall, Tsang, Goldman, 
& Pennington, 1999; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Yacker & 
Weinberg, 1990), while many others have empirically refuted these findings (Daniels, 
D'Andrea, & Heck, 1995; Derry & Green, 1989; Forte, 2008; Friedman, Robinson, & 
Friedman, 1987; Garrod, Beal, & Shin, 1990; Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; Knox, 
Fagley, & Miller, 2004; Rest, 1979; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker, 1984, 
1986). 
Langdon et al. (2010a) reviewed the literature that has attempted to investigate 
the moral development of people with IDs, and none of the studies included attempted 
to investigate sex differences, although one study reported that girls with IDs tended 
to appeal to helping others more frequently than did boys (Petrovich, 1982), while 
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another commented that there was no difference between boys and girls with IDs 
when asked what they “should do” when given a temptation to steal task (Jackson & 
Haines, 1982).  Following on, there has been little attention given to the differences 
between men and women with IDs who engage in criminal offending behaviours, 
bearing in mind that there is an emerging literature examining the characteristics of 
women with IDs who have engaged in criminal offending behaviours (Lindsay et al., 
2004). 
Although this literature remains sparse, there are some emerging similarities 
between the few studies within this area.  Lindsay et al. (2004) reported that a small 
sample of women with IDs and a history of criminal offending were more likely to be 
younger, have histories of being sexual abused,  and have higher rates of aggression 
and mental illness compared to a sample of men with IDs who also had a history of 
criminal offending.  Similarly, Alexander et al. (2010) reported that women with IDs 
and a history of criminal behaviour were more likely to be diagnosed with a mental 
health problem, namely personality disorder, and they reported a similar finding 
previously in a different study, where aggression and a history of sexual abuse were 
reported to be more prevalent amongst women with IDs (Alexander, Piachaud, & 
Gangadharan, 2005; Alexander, Piachaud, Odebiyi, & Gangadharan, 2002).  Lindsay, 
Steele, Smith, Quinn and Allan (2006) also reported that a sample of women with IDs 
who were offenders were younger, had problems with aggression and sexual 
relationships, and higher rates of mental health problems, while they also had lower 
rates of recidivism, when compared to groups of men with IDs who also had a history 
of criminal offending.  However, there have been no studies that have attempted to 
understand potential sex differences in the aetiology of offending amongst people 
who have IDs.  
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As a consequence of the suggested relationship between criminal offending 
and moral reasoning, and the emerging evidence that a similar relationship may exist 
for men with IDs, coupled with the lack of research involving women with IDs, we 
undertook the current study which had the following two aims (a) to examine the 
moral reasoning abilities of four groups of people:  (i) men and women with IDs who 
had a documented history of criminal offending, and (ii) men and women with IDs 
and no such history, and (b) to examine the emotional and behavioural problems 
within these four groups and any relationship with moral reasoning.  The following 
three specific hypotheses were made (a) there will be no significant difference 
between the moral reasoning abilities of men and women with IDs, (b) men and 
women with IDs who are not offenders  will have “developmentally immature” moral 
reasoning in comparison to offenders, as proposed by Langdon et al. (2011a), and (c) 
moral reasoning ability will significantly predict emotional and behavioural problems.   
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty eight people with mild IDs (50% women, Mage = 35.68, SD = 12.58, 
MFIQ = 59.90, SD = 7.70) were recruited from the community or inpatient forensic 
mental health care services in the United Kingdom and spread equally across four 
groups (a) men who are offenders (MO Group, Mage = 35.82, SD = 14.20, MFIQ = 
61.94, SD = 4.55), (b) women who are offenders (WO Group, Mage = 34.12, SD = 
12.29, MFIQ = 62.00, SD = 5.65), (c) men (M Group, Mage = 39.65, SD = 12.87, MFIQ 
= 60.12, SD = 6.17), and (d) women (W Group, Mage = 33.12, SD = 10.88, MFIQ = 
55.13, SD = 4.16), who both had no known history of criminal offending.    The age 
of participants across the four groups did not differ significantly, F(3, 64) = <1, p = 
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.46, while the Full Scale IQ between the four groups did differ significantly, F(3, 64) 
= 5.82, p = .001.  Posthoc testing employing the Sidak method revealed that the W 
Group had a significantly, p < 0.05, lower Full Scale IQ than the three other groups, 
while there was no significant difference between the MO, WO or M Groups, p > 
0.05. 
 The specific inclusion criteria for all participants were, a) evidence of mild 
IDs as indicated by a Full Scale IQ of less than 70, and associated difficulties with 
adaptive behaviour.  Difficulties with adaptive behaviour were assumed to be present 
if the individual was in receipt of support from services for people with IDs, and b) 
aged 18 or greater.  Turning to the offenders, they were included only if they were 
detained using the Mental Health Act, 1983 (amended, 2007) and had committed an 
indictable offence that had been dealt with by a Crown Court in England, indicating 
that they had committed serious crimes that could not be dealt with by a magistrates 
court.  Non-offenders were included if they had no known offence history, including a 
history of arrests, cautions or convictions.  Participants who were thought to be non-
offenders were asked whether they had any history of arrests, cautions or convictions, 
and care records were checked for any evidence of offending behaviours.  
Additionally, carers were also asked whether they knew whether the person with IDs 
had any history of criminal offending behaviours.  If there was any evidence of 
offending behaviour, the participant was excluded.  Finally, participants with a 
diagnosis of an autistic spectrum condition were also excluded from both the offender 
and non-offender groups.  
 In order to account for the difficulties with indexing convictions simply by 
frequency, without taking severity into account, offence data collected about the WO 
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and MO Groups were ranked in terms of severity by drawing on the findings of 
Francis, Soothill and Dittrich (2001) who used a paired-comparisons method to devise 
an offence seriousness score.  This method has been used previously (Langdon, et al., 
2011b).  Regarding the offence severity score, there was no significant difference 
between the MO and the WO Group, z = 1.13, p = 0.27. 
Design 
 A 2 (Sex: Men or Women) X 2 (Offending: Offenders or Non-Offenders) 
between-groups design was used to investigate the hypotheses.  Participants were 
invited to complete the following measures (a) Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence, (b) Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form, and (c) Emotional 
Problems Scales Self Report Inventory.  Carers or staff were asked to complete the 
Emotional Problems Scales Behavior Rating Scale.   
 Measures.  General Intellectual Functioning. The Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Wechsler, 1999) was used to estimate the general 
intellectual functioning of participants.   The WASI is a shortened version of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – III (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1998), and contains 
four subtests which assess verbal and non-verbal reasoning.  If WAIS-III scores were 
available for participants that had been calculated within the last 5 years, these were 
used instead of WASI scores, with consent from the participant.  
Moral Reasoning.   The Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM-SF) is a 
production measure of moral reasoning (Gibbs, et al., 1992) and has been shown to 
possess high levels of test-retest reliability (r = .88; Gibbs, et al., 1992), and excellent 
internal consistency (α = .92; Gibbs, et al., 1992).  Langdon et al. (2010b) 
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demonstrated that the SRM-SF has substantial internal consistency and good test-
retest reliability when used with men with IDs.     
The measure comprises eleven questions, and generally takes about twenty 
minutes to present.  The questions relate to the following seven constructs, a) Contract 
(questions one to three), b) Truth (question four), c) Affiliation (questions five and 
six), d) Life (questions seven and eight), e) Property (question nine), f) Law (question 
ten), and g) Legal Justice (question eleven).   
Verbatim answers to the questions are scored according to a set of complex 
rules and heuristics, and the development of proficient and reliable scoring occurs 
through the use of practice scoring material (Gibbs, et al., 1992).  Responses to each 
question are assigned a developmental rating which corresponds to a moral stage 
associated with Gibb’s Socio-Moral Reasoning Theory.  An overall score is 
calculated, and as shown in Table 1, these scores correspond to a person’s global 
moral stage.   Additionally, moral stage ratings can be generated for each of the seven 
constructs examined by the SRM-SF; the scores generated across these constructs are 
also interpreted using Table 1. The inter-rater reliability of the scoring of the SRM-SF 
was calculated using an expert blind rater (PEL) who scored a random sample of 29% 
(n=20) of completed questionnaires.  Interrater reliability was determined to be ICC = 
.99.  
Emotional and Behavioural Problems.  Two measures were used to index 
emotional and behavioural problems.  The first was the Emotional Problems Scales 
Self Report Inventory (SRI, Prout & Strohmer, 1991), which was completed by 
participants, while the second measure was the Emotional Problems Scales Behavior 
Rating Scale (BRS, Prout & Strohmer, 1991), which was completed by carers or staff 
members.  The SRI is a 147-item questionnaire designed for use with people with 
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mild IDs.  The questionnaire has six subscales (a) positive impression, (b) 
thought/behaviour disorder, (c) impulse control, (d) anxiety, (e) low self-esteem, and 
(f) depression.  Prout and Strohmer (1991) have reported that the internal consistency 
for the SRI  subscales ranges from α = .77 to .96, while the test re-test reliability 
ranges from .65 to .92.   The BPS is a 135-item questionnaire which asks respondents 
questions about the behaviour of the participant over the last month.   The person 
completing the BPS must know the participant well, as they are asked to rate how 
frequently the participants engages in various behaviours; therefore only key staff or 
family members were invited to complete this instrument.  The BRS is comprised of 
12 subscales (a) thought/behaviour disorder, (b) verbal aggression, (c) sexual 
maladjustment, (d) non-compliance, (e) hyperactivity, (f) distractibility, (g) anxiety, 
(h) somatic concerns, (i) withdrawal,  (j) depression, and (k) low self-esteem.  Four 
subscales are summed to form the Externalising Behaviour Problems Scale, while 
three subscales are summed to form the Internalising Behaviour Problems Scale.   
Prout and Strohmer (1991) have reported that the internal consistency for the BRS 
subscales ranges from α = .90 to .97, while the inter-rater reliability ranges from .26 to 
.96.    
Procedure 
 A favourable ethical opinion was sought and gained from the Essex National 
Health Service (NHS) Research Ethics Committee for this study.  Consent was sought 
from all participants.  Participants were also asked for consent to speak to a person 
who knew them well and the researchers asked them to complete the BRS.   
 Both the M and W Groups were recruited from the community.  Community 
services for people with IDs within the east of England, which included NHS services 
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and County Council services, were approached and asked to share information about 
the study with participants who they thought met the inclusion criteria.  Staff were 
asked not to share information about the study with anyone in the community who 
they knew had a history of arrests, cautions or convictions.  Similarly, for the MO and 
WO Groups, inpatient forensic mental health services were approached and also asked 
to share information with participants who they thought met the inclusion criteria.  
Staff within the community and within hospitals were asked to only share information 
about the study with participants who were likely to have capacity to give or withhold 
consent to participate in the study.  Participants who provided consent to take part in 
the study were asked to complete the WASI initially, as needed, before being invited 
to complete the other questionnaires.   
Data Analysis 
 All data were entered and analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20.0.0.  
Descriptive data were generated  and  inspected for departures from normality.  Some 
of the individual constructs on the SRM-SF, and the subscales of the SRI and BRS 
departed from normality, while total scores on these measures did not.  As a 
consequence, bootstrapping using 5000 samples with replacement was employed 
within a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Offending) ANCOVA, where Full Scale IQ was the covariate.  
The F Statistic was generated using a parametric model; main effects were 
investigated independent of the interaction, while the interaction was examined within 
a full factorial model.  Parameter estimates were generated using bootstrapping and 
the bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) 95% confidence intervals (CI) were 
calculated.  The significance level (two tailed) reported was derived using 
bootstrapping.   In order to understand the relationship between moral reasoning and 
Running head: MORAL REASONING                                                                      13 
 
emotional and behavioural problems, the Total Pathology Score from the SRI, and the 
Externalising and Internalising Behaviour Scores from the BRS were predicted 
independently using Total SRM-SF scores within linear regression. Data were centred 
around their mean, and again, bootstrapping using 5000 samples with replacement 
was employed and the bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) 95% confidence intervals 
(CI) and p values were calculated.  
Results 
Aim 1: The Moral Reasoning Abilities of the Men and Women with Intellectual 
Disabilities 
 General intellectual functioning accounted for 16% of variability in total moral 
reasoning scores, R2 = .16; β = .39; B = 2.18; t = 3.48, p = .001; BCa 95% CI [1.01, 
3.37], and was included as a covariate in the analysis.  There was no significant 
difference between men and women, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .98, BCa 95% CI [-11.76, 
11.92], while non-offenders scored significantly lower than offenders,  F(1, 64) = 
33.08, p < .001, BCa 95% CI [-49.11, -24.49] on the SRM-SF Total Score.  The Sex 
X Offending interaction for SRM-SF Total Score was not significant, F(1, 64) = < 1, 
p = .79, BCa 95% CI [-25.26, 18.80], (Table 2).   
 Turning to the seven constructs on the SRM-SF, there was no significant 
difference between men and women on Contract, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .97, BCa 95% CI 
[-14.18, 15.75], Truth, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .63, BCa 95% CI [-19.24, 32.78], 
Affiliation, F(1, 64) = 1.34, p = .23, BCa 95% CI [-27.07, 7.11], Life, F(1, 64) = < 1, 
p = .59, BCa 95% CI [-15.17, 27.84], Property, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .44, BCa 95% CI [-
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14.36, 34.38], Law, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .68, BCa 95% CI [-17.54, 28.61], or Legal 
Justice, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .65, BCa 95% CI [-36.19, 21.52], (Table 2). 
 Offenders scored significantly higher that non-offenders on Contract, F(1, 64) 
= 23.43, p < .001, BCa 95% CI [-58.54, -26.54], Truth, F(1, 64) = 4.45, p = .04, BCa 
95% CI [-58.93, -.76], Affiliation, F(1, 64) = 5.85, p = .02, BCa 95% CI [-40.84, -
3.60], Life, F(1, 64) = 5.67, p = .01, BCa 95% CI [-48.23, -7.23], Property, F(1, 64) = 
15.36, p < .001, BCa 95% CI [-76.15, -28.12], Law, F(1, 64) = 4.94, p = .04, BCa 
95% CI [-56.06, -4.41] and Legal Justice, F(1, 64) = 16.09, p = .001, BCa 95% CI [-
99.98, -33.59], (Table 2).  None of the Sex X Offending interactions were significant 
across the seven SRM-SF constructs, p > .05. 
Aim 2:  The Relationship between Moral Reasoning and Emotional and 
Behavioural Problems  
Initially, subscale scores and total scores on the SRI and the BRS were 
compared across the groups (Table 3 and 4).    Considering the subscales of the SRI, 
there was no significant difference between men and women on Positive Impression, 
F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .67, BCa 95% CI [-1.67, 1.06], Thought/Behaviour Disorder, F(1, 
64) = < 1, p = .85, BCa 95% CI [-2.64, 2.19], Impulse Control, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = 
.36, BCa 95% CI [-4.74, 1.79], Anxiety, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .67, BCa 95% CI [-2.09, 
3.39], Depression, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .90, BCa 95% CI [-3.72, 3.21], and Self Esteem, 
F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .77, BCa 95% CI [-1.69, 2.37].  The Total Pathology score was not 
significantly different between men and women, F(1, 64) = < 1, p = .86, BCa 95% CI 
[-13.24, 11.14]. 
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There was no significant difference between offenders and non-offenders on 
Positive Impression, F(1, 64) = 2.75, p = .11, BCa 95% CI [-.22, 2.90], while 
offenders scored significantly higher than non-offenders on Thought/Behaviour 
Disorder, F(1, 64) = 8.07 1, p = .005, BCa 95% CI [-6.56, -1.09], Impulse Control, 
F(1, 64) = 8.02, p = .003, BCa 95% CI [-8.65, -1.78], Anxiety, F(1, 64) = 4.50, p = 
.02, BCa 95% CI [-6.03, -.60], Depression, F(1, 64) = 12.67, p < .001, BCa 95% CI [-
10.72, -3.32] and Low Self-Esteem, F(1, 64) = 7.60, p = .004, BCa 95% CI [-5.46, -
.92].  Turning to Total Pathology on the SRI, again, offenders scored significantly 
higher than non-offenders, F(1, 64) = 10.49, p = .001, BCa 95% CI [-35.25, -9.83], 
(Table 3).   None of the Sex X Offending interactions were significant for the SRI, p 
> .05.  
 Examining the subscales of the BRS revealed that women scored significantly 
higher than men on Physical Aggression, F(1, 40) = 5.04, p = .02 BCa 95% CI [-7.92, 
-.85], and Verbal Aggression, F(1, 40) = 4.06, p = .05, BCa 95% CI [-7.24, -.17].  
There was no significant difference between men and women on Non-Compliance, 
F(1, 40) = 1.27, p = .30, BCa 95% CI [-9.65, 2.17], Hyperactivity, F(1, 40) = 1.16, p 
= .29, BCa 95% CI [-6.33, 1.84], Depression, F(1, 40) = 3.68, p = .08, BCa 95% CI [-
9.12, .50], Anxiety, F(1, 40) = <1, p = .79, BCa 95% CI [-6.19, 4.80], Low Self-
Esteem, F(1, 40) = 2.87, p = .09, BCa 95% CI [-11.80, .69], Thought/Behaviour 
Disorder, F(1, 40) = 2.05, p = .19, BCa 95% CI [-10.18, 2.05], Sexual Maladjustment, 
F(1, 40) = 2.01, p = .16, BCa 95% CI [-3.93, .62], Distractibility, F(1, 40) < 1, p = 
.65, BCa 95% CI [-5.69, 3.41], Withdrawal, F(1, 40) = <1, p = .52, BCa 95% CI [-
7.29, 3.69], or Somatic Concerns, F(1, 40) = 1.06, p = .35, BCa 95% CI [-8.78, 3.48], 
(Table 4).   
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Offenders scored significantly higher than non-offenders on Physical 
Aggression, F(1, 40) = 6.38, p = .02, BCa 95% CI [-11.04, -2.04], Verbal Aggression, 
F(1, 40) = 6.38, p = .008, BCa 95% CI [-9.35, -2.01], Non-Compliance, F(1, 40) = 
4.59, p = .03, BCa 95% CI [-14.54, -1.19], Depression, F(1, 40) = 11.69, p = .005, 
BCa 95% CI [-14.99, -4.88], Thought/Behaviour Disorder, F(1, 40) = 9.82, p = .01, 
BCa 95% CI [-18.99, -4.52], and Sexual Maladjustment, F(1, 40) = 16.70, p < .02, 
BCa 95% CI [-9.37, -2.58].  There was no significant difference between offenders 
and non-offenders on Hyperactivity, F(1, 40) = 1.53, p = .29, BCa 95% CI [-8.80, 
1.57], Anxiety, F(1, 40) = 1.29, p = .34, BCa 95% CI [-10.10, 2.07], Low Self 
Esteem, F(1, 40) = 4.91, p = .10, BCa 95% CI [-18.47, -.65], Distractibility, F(1, 40) 
= 1.19, p = .31, BCa 95% CI [-8.33, 1.45], Withdrawal, F(1, 40) = 3.12, p = .11, BCa 
95% CI [-11.42, -.33], and Somatic Concerns, F(1, 40) = 1.06, p = .30, BCa 95% CI [-
10.88, 2.99], (Table 4). 
There was a significant Sex X Offending Interaction for Anxiety, F(1, 39) = 
4.73, p = .04, BCa 95% CI [1.03, 20.37]; the MO and W Group scored lower, while 
the WO and M Group scored higher on Anxiety, although posthoc testing comparing 
the four groups did not reveal any significant differences, p > 0.05 (Sidak Method).  
The interaction for Sexual Adjustment was just significant, F(1, 39) = 4.22, p = .05, 
BCa 95% CI [1.10, 7.66]; interestingly, the WO Group scored significantly higher 
than the M Group, p = .04, BCa 95% CI [1.31, 6.60], and the W Group, p = .02, BCa 
95% CI [1.86, 6.90], while the differences between the MO, M and W Groups were 
not significant, p > 0.05.  None of the remaining interactions were significant, p > 
0.05. 
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Turning to the Externalising Scale on the BRS, offenders scored significantly 
higher than non-offenders, F(1, 40) = 5.65, p = .03, BCa 95% CI [-41.51, -6.08], 
while there was no significant difference between men and women, F(1, 40) = 3.06, p 
= .09, BCa 95% CI [-28.74, .75], nor was the interaction significant, F(1, 39) = 1.41, p 
= .20, BCa 95% CI [-10.01, 47.17].  Offenders also scored significantly higher on the 
Internalising Scale, F(1, 39) = 5.85, p = .03, BCa 95% CI [-42.59, -4.18],  while again 
there was no significant difference between men and women, F(1, 40) = 2.08, p = .17, 
BCa 95% CI [-25.85, 4.77], and nor was the interaction significant, F(1, 40) = 2.45, p 
= .11, BCa 95% CI [-4.91, 49.61], (Table 4). 
Total SRM-SF scores significantly predicted the Total Pathology scale on the 
SRI, R2 = .10; β = .32; B = .29; t = 2.71, p = .004; BCa 95% CI [.12, .47], explaining 
10% of the variance.   Total SRM-SF scores also significantly predicted the 
Internalising Behaviour scale, R2 = .15; β = .39; B = .29; t = 2.76, p = .007; BCa 95% 
CI [.09, .50], and the Externalising Behaviour scale, R2 = .09; β = .31; B = .24; t = 
2.07, p = .02; BCa 95% CI [.05, .44], on the BRS, explaining 15% and 9% of the 
variance respectively.   
Discussion 
As predicted, the entire sample had “developmentally immature” moral 
reasoning abilities, but non-offenders had a greater degree of “immaturity” than did 
offenders.  Also, as predicted, the moral reasoning scores of women and men did not 
differ significantly, while moral reasoning scores significantly predicted emotional 
and behavioural problems within the entire sample.  
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The finding that non-offenders had a greater degree of “immaturity” than 
offenders is similar to the findings of  Langdon et al. (2010b; 2011b), who reported 
that non-offenders with IDs had “developmentally immature” moral reasoning, and 
they tended to appeal to rule-governed behaviour and avoidance of punishment more 
so when making moral judgements as compared to offenders on some of the 
constructs assessed by the SRM-SF.   Interestingly, and similar to what was found in 
previous studies, the non-offender and offender groups both had overall moral 
reasoning abilities that fell within Stage 2 and Stage 2(3) (Table 1 & 2); these stages 
are associated with pragmatic exchanges and instrumental gain, and therefore are 
more likely to be associated with illegal behaviour; although Stage 2(3) represents 
some further decentration beyond Stage 2.  However, one group had a history of 
offending, while the other did not, which is inconsistent with the relationship between 
moral reasoning and illegal behaviour.  This inconsistency may be explained by the 
fact that the moral reasoning scores of non-offenders fell within an earlier 
developmental stage, namely transition Stage 2(1), on Law and Legal Justice, while 
the two offender groups had moral reasoning scores on these two constructs that that 
fell within a higher stage, namely Stage 2, and Stage 2(3) (Table 2).     
As suggested previously by Langdon et al. (2010b), it is apparent that the 
moral reasoning of the non-offender groups on the Law and Legal Justice constructs 
reflects more of the earlier moral developmental stages which are associated with rule 
governed behaviour and avoidance of punishment, thus inherently reducing the 
probability of criminal behaviour.  For the offender groups, their moral reasoning can 
be more characterised by justifications which involve pragmatic advantages, needs, 
and deals or exchanges more definitively on the Law and Legal Justice constructs, 
thus increasing the probability of criminal offending.    
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It is worth nothing that Langdon et al. (2011b) reported that the moral stage on 
the Law constructs amongst men with IDs who were not offenders fell clearly within 
Stage 1, while it fell within Stage 2(1) for Legal Justice.  In an earlier study, Langdon 
et al. (2010b) also reported that the moral stage of a different group of men with IDs 
who were non-offenders fell within Stage 2(1) on these two constructs, which is the 
same as that found within the current study.   These differences may be associated 
with the use of convenience sampling within the current and previous two studies, but 
what seems to be emerging is that non-offenders with IDs, across both sexes, appear 
to have moral reasoning within the Law and Legal Justice constructs that reflect some 
avoidance of punishment and rule governing behaviour, which may reduce the 
probability of illegal behaviour.  
Turning to consider the differences between men and women, there were no 
differences between the groups on moral reasoning, and although some studies have 
reported a difference (e.g. Crandall, et al., 1999), the current findings are consistent 
with many empirical studies that have refuted the existence of such a difference (e.g. 
Gregg, et al., 1994).  However, there were some differences between men and women 
on the measures of emotional and behavioural problems, but these differences were 
not apparent using the SRI, which is a self-report measure.  The BRS, which was 
rated by carers and staff, indicated that women with IDs had higher levels of both 
verbal and physical aggression.   
Offenders also had higher levels of psychopathology compared to non-
offenders, which was evident from both the staff and self-report measures of 
emotional and behavioural problems.  This was evident across all subscales on the 
SRI, while on some subscales of BRS there were no differences between offenders 
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and non-offenders.   Also on the BRS, women with IDs and a history of criminal 
offending had higher levels of inappropriate sexual behaviour than men and women 
from the community, but not higher than offenders who are men; offenders who are 
men did not have higher levels of inappropriate sexual behaviour than men and 
women from the community.  Inappropriate sexual behaviour, as assessed within the 
BRS includes preoccupation with sexual matters, inappropriate sexualised language 
and sexual overtures, along with aggressive sexual behaviour.   It has been previously 
reported that women with IDs who are offenders may have difficulties with sexual 
relationships (Lindsay, et al., 2006). 
One of the assumptions underlying moral development theory is that moral 
reasoning relates to behaviour, and while there is robust evidence that there is a 
relationship between moral reasoning and criminal offending amongst young 
offenders (Stams, et al., 2006), and evidence to suggest the same amongst men with 
IDs (Langdon, et al., 2011b), there is no evidence that moral reasoning relates to 
emotional and behavioural problems in people with IDs.   The finding that moral 
reasoning predicts emotional and behavioural problem within the current study is of 
importance, although the amount of variance explained was relatively small, varying 
from 9 to 15%.   However, the linear and positive relationship was significant and 
does indicate that moral reasoning predicts emotional and behavioural problems 
amongst people with IDs, although direct causality cannot be inferred from the 
current study.   
There are some problems with this study that are important to outline.  Firstly, 
a convenience sampling method was used, which may have introduced some bias.  
Secondly, there were some difficulties with the response rate from staff and carers 
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who were asked to complete the BRS.  Some of the differences between the groups 
within the BRS may have reached statistical significance with a larger sample size, 
which does tend to limit the conclusions that can be drawn as a consequence; with a 
larger sample, some of the differences between men and women with a history of 
criminal offending may have become further apparent.  Finally, it is important to note 
that moral reasoning or moral judgement is one of many factors that relate to an 
individual’s propensity to engage in criminal offending behaviours.  The 
developmental model presented by Loeber, Wim, Slot and Stouthamer (2006) 
captures many additional risk and protective factors that impact upon the probability 
that delinquency will emerge.  However, many social factors, that are known to relate 
to criminal offending behaviour, also relate to moral development. 
In summary, it is relevant to clinicians and practitioners that men and women 
with IDs who are offenders have similar moral reasoning abilities, as do men and 
women with IDs who are not offenders, and this predicts emotional and behaviour 
problems.  There is some tentative evidence that clinical interventions for offenders 
with IDs that attempt to address moral developmental “delays” may potentially be 
effective with this population (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Palmer, & Rees, 2013), 
although this intervention has not been tested with women with IDs who are 
offenders, and definitive trials are needed to determine effectiveness.   Further work 
in this area is needed, and interventions that aim to address a moral developmental 
“delay”, which is related to criminal offending behaviour amongst men and women 
with IDs, and theoretically grounded, could be beneficial in further reducing 
recidivism amongst this population. 
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The relationship between scores on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form 
(SRM-SF) and moral stages.  
 
Score Moral Stage 
100 to 125 Stage 1 
126 to 149 Transition Stage 1(2) 
150 to 174 Transition Stage 2(1) 
175 to 225  Stage 2 
226 to 249 Transition Stage 2(3) 
250 to 274 Transition Stage 3(2) 
275 to 325 Stage 3 
326 to 349 Transition Stage 3(4) 
350 to 374 Transition Stage 4(3) 
375 to 400 Stage 4 
 
  








(n = 17) 
WO Group 
(n = 17) 
M Group 
(n = 17) 
W Group 
(n = 17) 
Total Score 236.29 (27.70) 235.06 (19.50) 196.71 (21.87) 193.65 (28.67) 
Contract   238.24 (31.60)   244.12 (21.20)   201.96 (31.12)   194.61 (44.38) 
Truth     225.00 (60.55)     214.70 (49.26)     188.24 (51.63)     178.13 (54.68) 
Affiliation     257.06 (40.39)     257.35 (32.79)     222.06 (40.39)     235.35 (40.56) 
Life 239.71 (39.59) 245.59 (54.66) 220.31 (35.61) 189.06 (43.25) 
Property   232.40 (46.57)   221.90 (40.70)   181.30 (57.37)   176.50 (56.23) 
Law     206.30 (62.92)     200.00 (36.51)     171.90 (48.20)     162.50 (38.73) 
Legal Justice     226.50 (61.54)     225.00 (54.60)     150.00 (51.89)     162.50 (61.91) 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; MO Group = Men Offenders; WO Group = Women  
Offenders; M Group = Men Non-Offenders; W Group = Women Non-Offenders 
 
  
















(n = 17) 
WO Group 
(n = 17) 
M Group 
(n = 17) 
W Group 
(n = 17) 
Total Pathology 61.41 (30.67) 58.00 (25.82) 34.71 (20.02) 41.82 (29.63) 
Positive Impression       5.88   (3.81)       6.29   (2.85)       7.41   (2.60)       7.88   (2.76) 
Thought/ Behaviour Disorder 8.24   (6.57) 7.53   (5.66) 3.71   (3.46) 5.53   (4.65) 
Impulse Control 15.00   (7.37) 15.41   (7.85) 8.76   (6.08) 11.53   (6.28) 
Anxiety 14.47   (5.92) 13.88   (5.37) 11.18   (4.23) 10.76   (8.00) 
Depression 14.65   (9.14) 13.24   (7.00) 6.06   (5.66) 8.59   (8.57) 
Low Self-esteem 9.06   (5.02) 7.94   (4.41) 5.00   (3.86) 5.41   (4.57) 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; MO Group = Men Offenders; WO Group = Women Offenders; M Group = Men Non-Offenders; W 
Group = Women Non-Offenders 
 









(n = 10) 
WO Group 
(n = 17) 
M Group 
(n = 6) 
W Group 
(n = 11) 
Externalising Behaviour Problem  34.90  (24.30) 56.24  (28.37) 27.00  (18.71) 29.91  (21.23) 
Internalising Behaviour Problem  32.60  (27.54) 52.76  (23.86) 30.33  (13.74) 28.18  (22.19) 
Physical Aggression     4.20    (4.10) 10.18    (8.92)    1.17    (1.17) 3.00    (2.10) 
Verbal Aggression 6.60    (5.62) 11.29    (6.49) 3.17    (4.12) 5.55    (5.54) 
Non-compliance 15.80  (11.70) 21.41    (9.67) 11.83    (8.18) 12.27    (8.82) 
Hyperactivity 8.30    (6.17)    13.35   (6.50)  10.83    (6.34) 9.09    (6.70) 
Depression 9.70    (9.01) 16.65    (6.84) 5.33    (3.50) 6.00    (6.96) 
Anxiety 10.40    (9.63) 15.53    (7.02) 15.50    (7.50) 10.09    (7.60) 
Self-esteem 12.50  (10.46) 20.59  (11.35) 9.50    (5.75) 12.09  (11.05) 
Thought/ Behaviour Disorder 13.30    (9.70) 20.47  (11.94) 11.33  (10.78) 13.55  (7.26) 
Sexual Maladjustment 1.00    (2.83) 4.53    (5.71) 0.67    (1.21) 0.27    (.91) 
Distractibility 9.80    (6.89) 13.82    (6.65) 14.33    (9.93) 14.33    (9.93) 
Withdrawal 7.90    (8.76) 12.65    (7.03) 8.67  (10.58) 8.67  (10.58) 
Somatic Concerns 7.50    (9.00) 13.59    (8.61) 10.00  (10.18) 10.00  (10.18) 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; MO Group = Men Offenders; WO Group = Women Offenders; M Group = Men Non-Offenders; W 
Group = Women Non-Offenders 
 
